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In the present essay the author propounds his 
answer to one of the problems with which he has 
b e e n most deeply concerned throughout his long 
lite as an economist. Beginning as a firm 
upholder of neoclassical theories, he was con-
vinced by the world depression of the nineteen-
thirties and the Second World War that neither in 
theoretical nor in practical tenus can the prob-
lems of our peripheral situation be resolved 
through economic ideas worked out in the 
centres; and this conviction was the starting-
point of a long process of self-criticism and 
reformulation of theories. 
There are many aspects of neoclassical 
theory with which he is dissatisfied. Outstanding 
among these are its explanations ot income 
distribution, capital accumulation, and the role of 
the market in internal economic affairs and 
international trade. Still less is he content with 
the slight importance that this theory accords, tor 
example, to the socio-economic structure, to 
internal and external power relations, to the 
surplus and to the time-lag in peripheral devel-
opment . 
Nevertheless, in his critique of economic 
1 iberal ism he recognizes and asserts that the basis 
of this doctrine, the idea of economic freedom, 
must be upheld and prized as one of the greatest 
human achievements. But its defence must not 
be al lowed to lead to the destruction of political 
freedom, to the grounding of economic liberty on 
authoritarianism. The great challenge consists, in 
his opinion, in reconciling the two liberties in a 
type of social organization which will be free and 
equi table both in the economic and in the 
political field. 
'"DiruL'tor of tlie Review. 
I 
Neoclassical theories and 
internal development 
1. The frustration of neoclassicism, 
In two earlier articles we have attempted to 
explore new paths in the interpretation of 
peripheral capitalism.1 What is the point of 
doing this? Why not examine this system in 
the light of neoclassical teachings? And 
rather than in the contemplation of funda-
mental changes, will not the solution lie in 
abiding faithfully by those teachings, and 
leaving the market forces to operate without 
artificial interference, so as to ensure the 
most efficient allocation of productive re-
sources and the rational distribution of the 
product thus obtained? 
As I said in the articles cited, I was a 
profoundly convinced neoclassicist. I be-
lieved —and still do— in the advantages of 
ideal competition and in the technical 
efficiency of the market, as well as in its great 
political significance. But peripheral capital-
ism is quite a different matter. And observa-
tion of the real facts of the case has 
persuaded me that those theories do not 
enable us to interpret or to tackle the major 
problems deriving from the way the system 
functions. 
I have made a strenuous effort to get 
away from the theories in question and to 
seek an intellectually independent explana-
tion of the phenomena of peripheral devel-
opment; and in this attempt I have met and 
continue to meet with strong opposition. 
The aim of the neoclassicists was to 
systematize and give logical consistency to 
the essential ideas of their classical forerun-
ners. Thus they formulated their great 
doctrinal conception of economic equilib-
rium and of the interdependence of all the 
factors intervening in the play of economic 
forces. 
As I recalled on some occasion, in my 
' S ee , "Critique of peripheral capitalism", CEPAL 
Review, N.° 1, first half of 1976, and "Socio-economic 
structure and crisis of peripheral capitalism", CEPAL 
Review, N.° 6, second half of 1978. 
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youth these theories seduced me by their 
precision and mathematical elegance; and 
also by their persuasive cogency. They 
showed that the free play of economic forces, 
subject to no interference whatever, led to 
the most efficient utilization of the factors of 
production for the benefit of the entire 
community, both in the international field 
and in internal development. Moreover, 
they incorporated an underlying ethical 
element which has undoubtedly contributed 
to their intellectual prestige. 
But in their striving after rigorous 
consistency, in the contempt with which 
their adherents looked down upon what in 
those bygone days were styled literary 
economists, these theories shelved impor-
tant aspects of social, political and cultural 
reality, as well as of the historical back-
ground of collectivities. 
In making a tenacious effort at doctrinal 
asepsis, they evolved their arguments in the 
void, outside time and space. If at the 
moment when these arguments were formu-
lated they seemed to represent a significant 
scientific advance, viewed in the light of the 
evolution of capitalism they involve a verita-
ble scientific aberration, especially when 
they endeavour to interpret the phenomena 
of the periphery. Nevertheless, they contain 
positive elements which should on no 
account be despised. 
I am not surprised that neoclassicism 
has bedazzled a pleiad of Latin American 
economist who, having been indoctrinated 
in certain schools in the centres, are now 
trying to apply their teachings to the praxis of 
peripheral development. And I also under-
stand their repudiation of interventions 
which, far from correcting the system's 
faults, are liable to make them even more 
disruptive, and often lead to bureaucratic 
perversion of the system itself. 
If the neoclassical economists were to 
confine themselves to building their castles 
in the air, without claiming that they 
represent reality, that would be a respect-
able intellectual pastime, apt at times to 
arouse admiration for the virtuosity of some 
of its eminent exponents overseas. But the 
position is very different when an attempt is 
made in these peripheral countries to ex-
plain development without taking account of 
the social structure, of the time-lag in 
peripheral development, of the surplus, and 
of all the characteristics of peripheral capi-
talism with which I have dealt in the articles 
cited. For it then becomes convincingly 
evident that the spontaneous play of eco-
nomic forces cannot conduce to equilibrium. 
The neoclassical theories' capacity for 
intellectual survival is explicable enough, 
especially when their rigorous logic is 
demonstrated by means of the system of 
equations which Walras and Pareto intro-
duced in their day, and which was the point 
of departure for the subsequent evolution of 
these theories. It is worth while to recall this 
at the present time, when such vigorous 
offshoots are springing up in some of the 
Latin American countries. 
I sincerely regret that we cannot avail 
ourselves of these doctrines. It would be 
wonderful to allow the forces of the economy 
to lead spontaneously to the efficiency and 
equity of the system, without bothering 
about the highly complex task of deliber-
ately influencing them. What is more, I 
confess that I should be prepared to justify, 
for the time being, certain collective sacri-
fices, if by their means we could definitively 
clear away the obstacles to development. 
However, this is not the case; and I feel 
that to give the reasons that have induced me 
to abjure orthodoxy is an intellectual need 
and a moral responsibility.2 But I am always 
willing and indeed anxious to engage in 
dialogue. And I should not hesitate to 
recognize that I was at fault, capitulate and 
mend my ways, if through dialogue I found 
good cause to do so. 
The reasons why I have long been in 
2This volte face should not be taken to be of recent 
date, as is sometimes believed. In reality my emanci-
pation began during the great world depression, when I 
had to throw overboard much of what I had learned and 
had also taught as a young university professor. 
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disagreement with neoclassical theories re-
late to income distribution, capital accumu-
lation, and the role of the market in respect of 
internal development and international trade; 
this last topic will be discussed in section 
II of the present article. While I assume, on 
what I believe to be solid grounds, that these 
theories are also far from explaining the 
phenomena of capitalist development in the 
centres, I will confine myself exclusively to 
the periphery, mainly because I think I 
know it better, and perhaps in order not to 
have to fight on two fronts at once, a risk 
which I should, of course, incur. 
Let us now embark on a critical analysis 
of neoclassical theories vis-à-vis the real 
facts of peripheral development. 
2. The system and its general equilibrium 
The first point to bear in mind is the basic 
principle of neoclassical theory, according 
to which the economic system, left to its own 
free and spontaneous devices under an 
absolutely competitive régime, tends to-
wards a position of general equilibrium in 
which the remuneration of each factor of 
production is determined by its respective 
marginal product, and the price of goods by 
their marginal utility. The marginal product 
is, of course, the additional quantity of 
product obtained by adding one more unit of 
the factor under consideration. 
This means that whatever the level of 
productivity, the principle of equal pay for 
equal skills will prevail. To that end, 
competition is essential, both among the 
entrepreneurs employing labour and among 
the members of the labour force in their 
endeavour to obtain employment. How does 
this competition affect the movement of the 
system towards equilibrium? To reply to this 
question, the dynamic process must be 
examined in accordance with the neoclassi-
cal method of reasoning. 
As was explained in the earlier articles 
referred to above, in the course of develop-
ment, thanks to capital accumulation, new 
and higher productivity layers of technolo-
gy are continually superimposed on those 
below, with the concomitant demand for 
labour. The supply is provided by the labour 
force employed in preceding technological 
layers, and by the manpower looking for 
employment on reaching working age. 
In the same articles it was also pointed 
out that in peripheral capitalism, while de-
mand for labour is relatively limited because 
of the insufficiency of capital accumulation, 
the supply is relatively plentiful, both be-
cause a large proportion of labour is employed 
in low-productivity layers of technology 
and because of the rapid rate of growth of the 
labour force. It is not so abundant, of course, 
in the case of manpower possessing the 
increasingly high-level skills required by 
the propagation of technique and the advance 
of development. 
Thus, however great the difference 
between the average productivity of the new 
technological layers and the marginal pro-
ductivity of the unskilled or semi-skilled 
labour force in the lower layers of technolo-
gy, the increase in pay will be very slight. In 
other words, the more limited is the marginal 
productivity of the labour force employed in 
the lower technological layers, the more 
difficult will it be for those with the same 
skills, absorbed in higher layers of technolo-
gy, to raise their marginal productivity and 
their earnings correlatively with the in-
crease in their average productivity, owing 
to the regressive competition of the labour 
force remaining in the low-productivity 
layers, as well as to its natural growth. 
Obviously, this regressive competition 
dwindles as demand for labour requires 
skills of which the supply becomes more and 
more limited, the higher their position in the 
scale. And this means an improvement in the 
capacity of the labour force to raise its 
marginal productivity in accordance with 
the increase in average productivity. 
The productivity increment which is not 
transferred to the labour force temporarily 
remains with the enterprises in the shape of 
profits. It is worth while to recall in passing 
that in neoclassical reasoning this temporary 
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character is ascribed to profits, in contrast 
with the persistent nature of the surplus in 
our argument. 
The profit incentive leads enterprises 
that have made gains to expand production, 
and similarly induces other enterprises to 
follow in their footsteps by introducing the 
new layers of technology. This competition 
between enterprises is reflected, of course, 
in an increase in overall demand for labour; 
and in so far as the supply is comparatively 
plentiful and precludes the correlative rise 
in earnings, the expansion of production will 
mean that prices fall until the marginal 
product and the income paid out break even 
at the point of equilibrium. Profits will then 
have disappeared, and all that will remain 
will be remuneration for entrepreneurial 
activities. 
This is a conclusion of maximum impor-
tance in neoclassical theory, since it implies 
that the productivity increment is trans-
ferred either through a rise in pay —in 
accordance with each individual's contribu-
tion to production as determined by his 
skills— or, in so far as this does not occur, 
through a fall in prices, so that in this way the 
fruits of development are disseminated 
throughout the whole community. 
This explains what was said elsewhere, 
i.e., that in neoclassical theories there was an 
underlying content of equity, except in the 
special case of land rent. Even so, in this 
latter instance equity could be achieved 
through taxation, without upsetting the 
equilibrium of the system. 
An essential aspect of this ethic is the 
concept of the temporary nature of profits, 
which is different from the concept of 
remuneration for entrepreneurial activities. 
This remuneration too is subject to the 
principle of marginal productivity under a 
competitive system. Even when, as noted 
above, profit had disappeared at the point of 
equilibrium, entrepreneurial remuneration 
would still be left. 
The neoclassicists, of course, draw a 
clear-cut distinction between the entrepre-
neurial function and the ownership of the 
means of production, whether or not they are 
combined in practice. From the conceptual 
standpoint this distinction is very important, 
since in the position of general equilibrium, 
the owners of capital do not obtain profits but 
interest on their capital. This is a point to 
which we shall revert later. 
The reasoning is accurate, but it over-
looks two phenomena: the surplus, and 
power relations. 
3. Neoclassical theories and the surplus 
It seems needless to dwell on the structural 
phenomenon of the surplus, which has been 
analysed in detail in the articles mentioned 
above. All that is appropriate at the moment 
is to recall a few essential points of funda-
mental divergence from neoclassical rea-
soning. 
First and foremost, the fruits of increased 
productivity are not reflected in a fall in 
prices in so far as they have not been 
transferred to the earnings of the labour 
force, but remain in the hands of the owners 
of the means of production in the shape of a 
surplus. 
No such downward trend in prices has 
made its appearance in peripheral develop-
ment, despite the steady rise in productivity. 
The surplus is left in the hands of the owners 
and tends to stay there, because, on account 
of the actual dynamics of the production pro-
cess, the additional employment required 
to expand tomorrow's production gener-
ates a rise in income today, which is the 
source of the increase in demand that allows 
the productivity increment to be absorbed. 
Otherwise, inter-enterprise competition 
would bring prices down as the neoclassical 
economists assume. 
The successive increases in demand 
which accompany productivity increments 
ceaselessly accumulate and circulate within 
the system. They do not vanish into thin air. 
Only part of them is transferred to the labour 
force, and the rest goes to swell the global 
surplus. 
Hence follows a conclusion of the 
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greatest importance. The concept of the 
surplus is similar to that of profit, since both 
have their origin in increased productivity; 
but while profits tend to disappear, accord-
ing to neoclassical reasoning, the global 
surplus is persistent. 
It is subject to two contrary movements. 
On the one hand, it increases through fur-
ther improvements in productivity; on the 
other, it decreases as in one way or another 
the sharing capacity of the labour force is 
strengthened in its different forms. 
The global surplus resulting from these 
two movements grows continuously at a rate 
exceeding the growth rate of the global 
product. If the aforesaid sharing capacity 
gains strength, and accordingly the growth 
rate of the surplus falls behind that of the 
product, the system reacts through price 
increases, with very serious consequences 
which, sooner or later, lead to its crisis. 
4, The possibility of dynamic equilibrium 
Thus, even if competition is absolutely free 
and unrestricted, the system heads towards a 
crisis rather than towards the dynamic 
equilibrium that neoclassical theory as-
sumes. This point needs stressing, because 
the neoclassical economists usually attribute 
the major defects of the system to the 
obstruction or elimination of competition 
—both among entrepreneurs and as regards 
the labour force— as well as to arbitrary in-
tervention on the part of the State. 
The fundamental cause of the crisis is 
that the capital accumulation potential of the 
surplus is frittered away in the privileged-
consumer society and in the siphoning-off of 
funds to the centres. If it were devoted to 
accumulation, under a régime of austere 
capitalism, the possibility of a measure of 
dynamic equilibrium would be conceivable. 
Now for a brief explanation. More vig-
orous capital accumulation would result in a 
gradual weakening of the system's tendency 
to exclude the lower strata from the benefits 
of development. The layers of technology 
where the marginal product is low, and 
where the strata in question are found, 
would be progressively eliminated, and 
their place would be taken by those immedi-
ately above them. As the process continued 
on these lines, the disparities between 
layers of technology would diminish and, 
consequently, so would the differences in 
productivity. In this way, the system would 
be brought to the point of equilibrium by an 
increase in the marginal product and in 
earnings rather than by a fall in prices. 
It is thus possible to conceive of a time 
when the whole of the labour force would be 
employed with great productivity in higher 
layers of technology. Homogeneity of tech-
nique would then have been reached, thanks 
to capital accumulation, after a more or less 
lengthy period of transition. Homogeneity, 
but not the suspension of the process, since 
new technological layers would go on being 
superimposed on one another, and capital 
accumulation would have to be continually 
increased in order to absorb the labour force 
employed in the preceding layers and the 
increase in that labour force: in other words, 
in order that the system should not revert to 
social heterogeneity. 
As marginal productivity and earnings 
rose in the manner described, the surplus 
would tend to disappear; it would gradually 
eat itself up, so to speak, in the unrestricted 
interplay of competition. While the neoclas-
sical economists of the periphery show little 
sign of concern for the dynamics of the 
system or for these harassing phenomena of 
heterogeneity, I do not find it hard to believe 
that they may perhaps have some such image 
in mind. This would account for their con-
viction that if the system were left to its own 
devices, without any interference what-
soever, the basic problems of peripheral 
development would be resolved. All the 
more so, inasmuch as they assume that in the 
process the system would draw closer to the 
distribution ethic of which something has 
already been said. 
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5. The tendency of the system is not 
towards equilibrium 
But as far as the periphery is concerned all 
this is remote from reality. Not only because 
the capitalism of the privileged-consumer 
society is anything rather than austere, but 
for another reason of transcendent signifi-
cance in the dynamics of the system, which 
we will go on to recall. 
The tendency of the surplus is not to 
peter out but to grow faster than the product. 
This growth makes it possible to imitate 
more and more closely the consumption 
patterns of the centres and at the same time 
to continue accumulating enough capital for 
the process in question to be kept up under 
the rule of market laws. 
As this happens, however, changes in 
the social structure are accompanied by an 
increasing capacity to obtain a share in the 
fruits of productivity on the part of the labour 
force disadvantaged by market laws. This 
power of participation counters the power of 
the upper strata, to the detriment of the 
global surplus. And a point is thus reached at 
which the latter tends to grow more slowly 
than the global product. It is the point at 
which, of course, entrepreneurs react by 
raising prices to recoup their losses. Thus 
inflation becomes inherent in the system in 
the course of structural change, and sooner 
or later leads to the use of force to restore the 
dynamics of the surplus. 
The system does not function properly 
unless the growth rate of the surplus is at 
least equal to that of the product; it does not, 
therefore, tend towards dynamic equilib-
rium, as might be deduced from the abstract 
arguments of neoclassical reasoning. 
6. Distribution and power relations 
In the appropriation of the surplus is to be 
found the source of the great distribution 
disparities of peripheral capitalism. Let us 
now extend our critique to neoclassical 
distribution theory. 
We said elsewhere that the higher the 
level of the skills necessitated by the pen-
etration of technique, the smaller was the 
difference between demand and supply, and 
the greater the capacity of the labour force to 
share in the fruits of technical progress. 
But a little thought will show that this is 
not an entirely spontaneous phenomenon, 
since the acquisition ofsuch skills is strongly 
influenced by the social power that enables 
those who are best-situated in the socio-
economic structure to obtain effective access 
to training opportunities, which are also 
affected by political power. 
It is true that as far as equality of training 
opportunities is concerned, great disparities 
can be seen, in keeping with the differences 
in individual ability and dynamism, and, 
therefore, aptitude for social mobility like-
wise varies widely. 
In earnings, at all events, there is an 
element of privilege. Unquestionably, too, 
the pay incentive is a powerful spur to 
undertaking the effort that training repre-
sents. Consequently there is also a certain 
ethical significance in the neoclassical argu-
ment which attributes earnings to the contri-
bution made by the individual to the 
production process. Ultimately, the market 
is the arbiter of his merits; but in the real 
possibility of making this training effort 
there is an element of social privilege. 
As regards earnings, the labour force 
whose capacity to share in the fruits of higher 
productivity is weak, under market laws, has 
no means of improving matters other than its 
trade-union and political power. That this 
leads to arbitrary attitudes there can be not 
doubt; but the appropriation of the surplus is 
arbitrary too. 
True, this redistributive power of the 
labour force means that its earnings may be 
higher than its marginal productivity, al-
though not its average productivity, except 
when the above-mentioned limit in the 
dynamics of the surplus is overstepped. But 
' the surplus too is higher, and in very great 
measure. 
The responsibility for the evils of the 
system is often laid, at least in part, upon 
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trade-union intervention which distorts 
market laws with upsetting effects on the 
equilibrium of the system. Trade-union 
power is in the last analysis the counterpart 
of capitalist concentration and the appropri-
ation of the surplus. I should not wish to 
underestimate the intellectual worth of the 
neoclassical writers of the centres —some of 
whom are very eminent indeed— by ascrib-
ing to them the simplistic attitude of regard-
ing trade-union power as anathema. But this 
simplism does appear in some neoclassicists 
of the periphery, who do not hesitate to 
maintain that unemployment is the conse-
quence of arbitrary trade-union or political 
intervention which prevents wages from 
dropping to their natural equilibrium level. 
In conclusion, the fruits of technical 
progress are not distributed according to 
marginal productivity as is assumed in 
neoclassical theory, but mainly through the 
power of the various social groups. And as 
the play of power relations is governed by 
no regulatory principle whatever, far from 
conducing to the dynamic equilibrium of the 
system, in the course of time it brings about a 
crisis: essentially a distributional crisis. 
7. Capital accumulation 
and the rate of interest 
We have argued that because of its contin-
uous growth the surplus is the primary 
source of capital accumulation. It is there-
fore understandable that this structural 
phenomenon of the surplus oversets the 
abstract propositions of neoclassicism with 
respect to accumulation. Since according to 
them profits were transient in character, and 
the fruits of higher productivity tended to be 
widely disseminated, a mechanism had to be 
devised that enabled the savings necessary 
for accumulation to be collected from the 
whole community. This is the mechanism of 
the rate of interest. The movement of the rate 
would encourage savings to the extent 
necessary for the introduction of new and 
higher-productivity techniques; and as their 
fruits would be distributed among all, all 
would be in a position to participate in the 
accumulation process in so far as they were 
prepared to defer current consumption. 
The rate of interest, in the position of 
general equilibrium, is given by coinci-
dence between the contribution made to the 
product by one marginal unit of capital and 
the marginal supply of savings. 
It might be inferred from neoclassical 
theory that there is no element of privilege at 
all in the ownership of capital, since in view 
of the diffusion of the fruits of technical 
progress, interest is the reward of those who 
accumulate capital by abstaining from cur-
rent consumption. 
The role of the rate of interest has been 
much discussed, but it seems needless to 
dwell on this point, since it is not thus that 
the greater part of the capital accumulation 
of enterprises is effected. 
Accumulation derives mainly from the 
surplus, either directly or indirectly. Under 
the capitalist system, in so far as the labour 
force saves at all, it does so to accumulate not 
capital in enterprises but chiefly various 
forms of consumptive capital. 
The surplus is not accumulated in 
enterprises in response to incentive of the 
rate of interest. The incentive is much 
stronger, and is determined by the amount of 
the surplus itself that is expected to accrue 
from the introduction of new layers of 
technology. It might have considerable 
dynamic impact on accumulation if there 
were not a contrary incentive — that of 
imitation of the consumption patterns of the 
centres. 
From another standpoint, if the surplus 
and the great distributional inequality it 
represents account for the evolution of the 
consumer society, this does not mean that an 
equitable redistribution of income will re-
solve the accumulation problem through the 
operation of the rate of interest. I think the 
propensity to consumption is very strong 
throughout the social structure; and if in the 
upper strata it is powerfully influenced by 
the imitation of the centres, at the other 
extreme of the structure, in the lower strata, 
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the growing propensity to consume as 
income increases is explained mainly by the 
privations of the sub-consumer society. 
There is some right on the side of those 
who contend, therefore, that income redis-
tribution would have adverse effects on 
capital accumulation; an idea which leads 
them to exalt the social role of those who 
appropriate the surplus. All of which is very 
much in keeping with a system based on the 
irrationality of appropriation from the stand-
point of the collective interest. The problem 
consists, therefore, in finding some other 
way of appropriating the surplus in order to 
distribute it equitably and at the same time 
to raise the rate of accumulation. But let us 
not look too far ahead, since much remains to 
be said before this point is reached. 
Another important role of the rate of 
interest on which stress is pertinaciously 
laid by the neoclassicists is that of efficiently 
guiding the selection of techniques. Though 
I consider, be it said in passing, that the 
technical options are fairly restricted; but 
this does not affect the argument under 
consideration. 
Still according to the neoclassicists, the 
selection of alternative techniques would 
seem to be greatly distorted by the manipu-
lation of die rate of interest, and the 
obstruction or suppression of competition in 
the determination of labour earnings. The 
monetary authorities, the argument alleges, 
induced by expansionist motives, generally 
establish a lower rate of interest than would 
be dictated by market laws, and this encour-
ages forms of investment which involve 
excessive saving of labour and the use of 
more capital than the market would warrant. 
Whether there is manipulation or not, the 
surplus is overlooked. Moreover, the trade-
union power of the labour force tends to 
push up wages above the level of its 
marginal product. Thus, market laws are 
distorted, and this precludes the selection of 
technical options consistent with a strict 
concept of economic efficiency. If the struc-
tural phenomenon of the surplus did not 
exist, if distribution were effected as the 
neoclassical economists imagine and if ac-
cumulation were governed by the rate of 
interest, this line of reasoning would be 
valid enough. But obviously it is not thus that 
the system operates. 
8. The regulatory role of the market 
Finally, this brings us to the concept of the 
market in neoclassical theory. As I have said 
elsewhere, the market lacks not only a social 
horizon —a horizon of equity— but also a 
time horizon. 
It is a crass error on the part of 
conventional theories to assign to the market 
the role of supreme regulator of the econo-
my. It is far from playing such a part, 
although this does not mean than it has not a 
value attributed to it by the same theories, 
i.e., that of bringing producers and consum-
ers into contact with one another. That the 
latter are influenced by perturbing forms of 
collective suggestion, there can be no possi-
ble doubt; but this can be largely explained 
by the existence of distributional privileges 
which it is sought to exploit. In any event, 
the final decision of the consumers is of 
paramount importance in determining the 
behaviour of enterprises. 
These are familiar arguments which 
fully justify the survival of the market as a 
technical instrument, as well as on account 
of its political significance. If the market 
were suppressed, decisions as to what is to 
be produced and consumed would be adopt-
ed exclusively at the top levels of the 
planning agency, which would have very 
serious political implications. 
But the market must not be confused 
with the factors that push it from behind, nor 
should it be expected to do more than it can. 
The market cannot modify the social struc-
ture whence emanate the power relations 
that largely determine income distribution, 
nor can it establish the necessary rate of 
accumulation. But if these and other major 
defects were corrected with foresight and in 
a spirit of equity, the market would become 
an effective mechanism for the allocation of 
productive resources. 
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II 
The significance of neoclassical theories 
on the international plane 
1. General considerations 
To understand neoclassical arguments on 
the international plane, a point which must 
always be borne in mind is the significance 
of the price-equilibrating mechanism under 
a régime of free competition. Let us recall, 
therefore, the basic assumption that the 
fruits of technical progress are distributed 
either through an increase in earnings or 
through a fall in prices. It does not matter 
that owing to the regressive competition of 
the labour force in lower layers of technolo-
gy, earnings do not rise correlatively with 
productivity, for in so far as this does not 
happen, competition between enterprises 
will bring down prices until the residual 
fruits of progress are transferred to the entire 
collectivity. 
If this argument were applied to centre-
periphery relations, we should see that the 
problem of the effects of the considerable 
differences in productivity resulting from 
the great structural disparities would also be 
resolved through the price mechanism. The 
periphery's external bottleneck would dis-
appear of its own accord if market laws were 
left to operate. If the lower level of produc-
tivity in the periphery prevents its exports of 
manufactures from competing in the centres, 
it is because earnings are higher than 
productivity. Consequently, if they are al-
lowed to fall to their point of equilibrium, 
industries which were not competitive will 
become so. Nor is this all. For the drop in 
salaries and wages will also reduce prices in 
those export activities that were already 
competitive. Herein would lie the efficacy of 
devaluation of the currency as an equilibrat-
ing instrument, according to neoclassical 
reasoning. 
If this argument were carried to an 
extreme, the conclusion might also be 
reached that the advantages of the price 
decline in the aforesaid export activities 
would be diffused throughout the interna-
tional community. For the reasoning to be 
correct, however, it would have to be shown 
that the price mechanism also spread 
throughout the international community the 
fruits of increasing productivity in the 
centres, in so far as they had not been 
reflected in a correlative rise in earnings. But 
this does not happen. 
In any event, if the periphery's manufac-
tures were to become competitive this 
would not be enough to correct the tendency 
to a bottleneck, since it is also essential that 
the centres should open their doors to such 
competition. But this does not happen 
either. The power of the enterprises and the 
power of the labour force combine to pre-
vent it. 
The fact that the periphery may resort to 
the well-known laws of the market in its 
endeavours to resolve this problem would 
certainly not have the merit of ensuring that 
the centres will do the same. 
As will be remembered, the centres set 
up serious obstacles to imports of those 
manufactures in which the periphery has 
attained or may attain competitive capacity. 
They are usually manufactures for which 
demand grows relatively slowly and which 
trade liberalization policy seldom covers. 
This policy, on the contrary, has been 
applied to the technically advanced indus-
trial goods in which technical innovations 
are incessantly embodied. The centres' for-
eign trade in these goods has expanded to an 
exceptional extent, and here the participa-
tion of the periphery has been relatively 
slight, notwithstanding liberalization. The 
transnational s prefer to invest in the centres 
themselves in order to secure these innova-
tions and put them into effect, although it is 
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true that they do also invest in those 
peripheral countries which attract them by 
offering them various facilities. But, general-
ly speaking, they do so in order to produce 
goods which in the centres are giving way to 
other more advanced products resulting 
from further innovations. For that very 
reason, the transnational s have no interest in 
exporting peripheral manufactures to the 
centres, inasmuch as it suits them better to 
broaden the market for the newer goods by 
exporting them to the periphery. 
Clearly, then, even if the periphery 
reduces its prices by means of currency 
devaluations or subsidies, the positive ef-
fects will be very limited as far as the centres 
are concerned. 
Furthermore, the opposition put up by 
entrepreneurs and workers alike to the 
importing of such goods is notorious, and 
this undoubtedly constitutes an additional 
reason why in this respect the transnational s 
do not display the drive by which they are 
characterized. 
Here again we encounter the effects of 
the structural disparity. Neither are the 
transnational s interested in internationaliz-
ing the production in which the dynamics of 
innovation is most manifest, nor is the 
periphery, technically and economically 
speaking, in a position to do so. And when it 
has acquired this capacity in the case of less 
technically advanced goods, the centres 
obstruct the corresponding imports. 
I am trying to expound these facts as 
objectively as possible. I think, however, 
that despite everything the centres could 
have launched an industrial redeployment 
policy which would progressively open their 
markets to those imports in which the 
periphery had attained satisfactory technical 
capacity. Such a policy might have been 
hoped for during those long years of prosper-
ity which preceded the crisis of 1973. But no 
such steps were taken. 
In contrast, it is by no-means uncommon 
for the centres to continue criticizing the 
very concept of import substitution in the 
periphery, and to lay insistent emphasis on 
the supremely important role of the transna-
tionals in the internationalization of periph-
eral production. 
It is with deep concern that I underline 
these facts, for they indicate that the centres, 
with very few exceptions, are still viewing 
the great problems of the periphery in the 
light of immediate and circumstantial inter-
ests. They show no signs of a long-term 
outlook, a conception at once bold and 
realistic of their world responsibilities. All 
they do is to take spasmodic action during 
crises in the periphery! 
This state of affairs is very serious, 
although more explicable today than a few 
years ago, since their own problems have 
now become so complicated. But on the 
other hand it is not so easily understandable 
that in the periphery itself the dogmas of 
neoclassicism should have distorted the 
interpretation of a reality which so greatly 
affects its fundamental interests. Import 
substitution is reviled, as if in order to export 
manufactures the mere intention of doing so 
were enough, and as if the industrial centres 
were panting to receive them. 
There can be no doubt that in some 
cases protection has been excessive, and that 
many mistakes have been made. But a 
distinction must be drawn between the 
irrationality of protection and the rationality 
of import substitution. Substitution was in 
reality a necessity imposed by the crises in 
the centres, and I greatly fear that the 
difficulties which the periphery is at present 
experiencing will again necessitate further 
substitution when, in contradistinction to 
what happened formerly, a considerable 
industrial export potential is now available. 
The effort to persuade the centres must be 
perseveringly pursued. But we must also 
convince ourselves that in the use of that 
potential under new systems of reciprocal 
trade among peripheral countries a basic 
solution of the problem of the external 
bottleneck is to be found. 
Two different motivations underlie 
economic theories: on the one hand, the 
zealous wish to find a scientific interpreta-
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tion for real phenomena; and on the other 
hand, the quest and observance of certain 
principles which are in line with specific 
economic or political interests. It is not 
always easy to disentangle these motiva-
tions, which are often inextricably bound 
up with one another. Thus, the classical 
theory of international trade has scientific 
validity given certain assumptions, but it 
also served to formulate that outdated pre-
scription for the international division of 
labour which accomodated dominating in-
terests both in the centre and the periphery. 
And thus it has long provided grounds for 
opposing, in the name of market laws, the 
deliberate industrialization of the periphery. 
We have already alluded, in other 
studies, to the way in which market laws are 
invoked to justify the present constellation 
of interests in the new centre-periphery 
relations, particularly with respect to trans-
nationals. Even so, we cannot omit a brief 
comment on market laws with regard to 
primary commodities. 
From the time of CEPAL's earliest 
studies we have made efforts to explain 
these commodities' weak capacity for retain-
ing the fruits of their increases in productivi-
ty. What is involved is not a natural law 
intrinsically affecting the commodities in 
question, a law immanent in their future 
evolution, but the social structure of the 
periphery and its relation to the structure of 
the centres. Let us summarize the position. 
Primary commodities are generally charac-
terized by a low income-elasticity of de-
mand, so that when their productivity in-
creases and the supply expands beyond 
certain limits, prices tend to fall. If the 
earnings of the labour force could appropri-
ate the productivity increment (as it is 
appropriated by the landowners when land 
is in relatively short supply), there would be 
no such price decline, albeit other factors 
may exert influence in the same direction. 
But this does not happen, because of the 
large proportion of manpower in lower 
layers of technology whose regressive 
competition prevents earnings from rising 
correlatively with the increase in productivi-
ty. Thus the internal terms of trade deterio-
rate, and so do the international terms of 
trade, in the case of exportable goods. This is 
bound to be the outcome of the play of 
market laws when they are not subjected to 
intervention in one way or another. 
Generally speaking, the centres have 
opposed such intervention when it concerns 
goods of special interest to the periphery, 
although their attitude in this respect has 
been less negative during recent times. But 
when their own products are affected they 
do not hesitate to violate market laws; thus, 
we have witnessed what has sometimes 
been the deliberate restriction of production 
in order to force up the world market prices 
of certain goods, while in other cases 
internal prices were protected against an 
international slump by recourse to various 
types of manipulation or compensation. 
In reality, the centres invoke market 
laws when a price decline does not affect 
their own production. Then they accept with 
approval the deterioration of the terms of 
trade for certain goods in which productivity 
is increasing. Moreover, to bring it about 
they advise the introduction of new tech-
niques, just as they counsel devaluation as a 
means of achieving external equilibrium. 
Only their reaction to the effects of this 
measure is to reap the benefits of the fall in 
prices in respect of exportable goods where 
no devaluation was necessary, while with-
standing imports of those goods which by 
virtue of devaluation become competitive. 
The centres are well able to defend their 
own interests. They cannot be blamed for 
such an attitude as long as there is no world 
development policy. But at all events it is a 
flagrant contradiction to invoke market laws 
in one instance and to forget all about them 
in another: a contradiction, however, which 
does not fail to do them useful service in 
practice, as long as believers in the efficacy 
of market laws for regulation purposes still 
exist in the periphery. Only fidelity to 
market laws is not usually compatible with 
the interests of peripheral development. 
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In the light of what has been said above 
it is justifiable to take a closer look at the 
problems mentioned. We will begin with the 
persistent trend towards external disequilib-
rium. 
2. The trend towards an external 
bottleneck and its spontaneous correction 
Needless to say, the growth of total income 
which goes hand in hand with development 
gradually modifies the composition of de-
mand in favour of manufactured goods 
which are continually diversified in the 
centres. Thus a highly important alternative 
presents itself: either to obtain such goods 
by increasing exports of primary commodi-
ties so as to be able to import them, or to 
produce them at home. 
For neoclassical theory the problem is 
very simple: a matter of trusting market laws 
to resolve it. It is true that domestic 
production is at a disadvantage in relation 
to the centres because of the time-lag in 
development. Well then, it should be left to 
market laws to depress wages until produc-
tion achieves economic efficiency. The fall 
in wages will also encourage the growth of 
exports, and in this way the market will 
determine of its own accord how far the 
increase in demand will be satisfied by 
expanding imports and how far by expand-
ing domestic production through spontane-
ous industrialization. 
From the standpoint of development 
praxis, the problem might be posed in the 
following simple terms. How is industriali-
zation to be tackled? Are market forces to be 
left to offset by the reduction of wages the 
differences between the cost of manufac-
tured goods in the centres and in the 
periphery, or is protection to be invoked to 
achieve this end? Protection, of course, 
contravenes the conventional theories of 
international trade, not, however, because 
the latter are not strictly logical, but because 
they overlook the consequences of the 
structural disparity in the centre-periphery 
system. 
To follow up these assertions, the effects 
of the disparities must be examined on a 
theoretical plane. Let us first do so with 
reference to the periphery as a whole in its 
relations with the centres. 
Allusion must first be made to the well-
known phenomenon of the differences in 
income-elasticity of demand, to which we 
shall continue to attach great importance. 
The relatively low income-elasticity of pri-
mary commodities in general, in comparison 
with that of the continually-diversified 
industrial goods, constitutes one of the 
elements in the congenital weakness of the 
periphery. 
If primary exports expand dispropor-
tionately to the growth of income in the 
centres, their prices tend to fall, and this 
decline offsets, wholly or in part, the effect of 
the increase in volume on the total value of 
exports, or, worse still, actually reduces this 
total value. 
3. Devaluation and protection 
This idea underlies the argument in favour 
of protection. For while it is true that 
protection means producing at higher costs 
what could be obtained more cheaply by 
buying abroad, it is equally undeniable that 
to encourage primary exports beyond a 
certain point causes a price decline which 
may be greater than the loss due to the cost 
difference. 
All this depends upon the relation 
between elasticities. On the one hand the 
price-elasticity of demand for exports be-
yond the limit set by the growth of income in 
the centres; and, on the other, the cost-
elasticity of the supply of import-substitut-
ing production. Let us look at one or two 
concrete examples to illustrate this point. 
Be it assumed that there is an increase 
in productive resources which makes it 
possible to expand exports or import-substi-
tuting production.3 Let it also be assumed 
3To simplify the argument, the proportion repre-
sented by the import component in each case has not 
been taken into account. 
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that the cost of the import-substituting 
production is 40% higher than the price of 
the corresponding imported goods. To offset 
this greater cost the currency is then devalu-
ated to the extent necessary to make import 
substitution possible and at the same time 
promote exports. 
The upholders of the conventional 
theories usually consider that devaluation4 
is the instrument used by market laws to 
fulfil their purposes ; an instrument which, to 
be sure, does not derive from the spontane-
ous play of market forces but from a 
deliberate decision on the part of those 
responsible for economic policy. But let us 
not dwell on these subtle issues. It should, 
however, be noted that devaluation causes a 
drop in real earnings, and to prevent them 
from rising again, is a requisite for the 
efficiency pursued. 
A 40% increase in the value of foreign 
currencies, besides encouraging import-
substituting activities, will push up the 
domestic prices of exports, thus encouraging 
an expansion of primary production for 
export. 
Now, if the latter's elasticity was such 
that for every 1% increase in volume the 
decrease in prices caused a loss of 0.4%, the 
value of exports would also be reduced by 
40%. From the standpoint of collective 
rationality, therefore, it would be a matter of 
indifference whether the increase in produc-
tive resources were devoted to exports or to 
import-substituting activity, or were distrib-
uted between the two. But this would be an 
accidental coincidence. 
In reality, the downward trend of prices 
is usually much more marked than in the 
example given. It not infrequently happens 
that for every 1% increase in the volume 
exported over and above the limits set by the 
growth of income in the centres, prices tend 
to fall in a similar or even greater proportion, 
A distinction should be drawn between this 
devaluation and the devaluation imposed by inflation 
when domestic prices exceed those quoted on the 
world market. 
so that the effects of the increase in volume 
would be cancelled out or a still bigger loss 
would be suffered. This would happen in all 
cases where the drop in prices was sharper 
than the fall that would have been caused by 
the aforesaid 40% reduction. 
To state this argument in general terms, 
it might be said that substitution would be 
desirable whenever the cost-elasticity of 
import-substituting production were less 
than the price-elasticity of exports. 
There is, of course, no selective princi-
ple in devaluation. All exports are encour-
aged by devaluation and the correlative rise 
in domestic prices, whatever the difference 
in elasticities. Thus if the price-elasticity 
of exports were higher than the cost-elastici-
ty of import substitution, the reduction in the 
value of the former would be greater than the 
loss that would be incurred through import-
substituting production. 
It should be noted in passing that the 
loss or the reduction are not net, but relate to 
the increment in production exported or in 
import-substituting production. 
Strictly speaking, this is the loss that the 
periphery must incur in order to step up its 
global product faster than the product of its 
exports and thus gradually absorb the labour 
force which export activities do not employ. 
The resulting increase in manufactured 
goods thus makes it possible to satisfy the 
growing demand for these which accompa-
nies development. 
The net advantage for the periphery 
consists in reducing to the minimum the loss 
in question as against the increase in the 
total product which industrialization brings 
about. 
Hence the advantages of a form of 
protection which is established only in the 
degree required to cover the differences in 
costs. Nor would there be any reason for it to 
be accompanied by a deterioration in the 
terms of trade for exports. But the neoclas-
sical economists cannot resign themselves to 
acknowledging the defects of market laws, 
and in order to ward off the negative effects 
of devaluation on exports, advocate taxation 
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to tap the increase in the prices of primary 
exports, since otherwise it would be lost 
through a price decline. Herein lies an 
astonishing inconsistency. They repudiate 
protection because it interferes with market 
laws, while at the same time they postulate a 
tax which is another way of violating them I 
If we follow up the thread of the 
neoclassical arguments a further highly 
suggestive aspect presents itself. Devalua-
tion, apart from its external effects, increases 
the surplus in all production for the home 
market. This should give no cause for 
concern, in the light of neoclassical reason-
ing, since competition will bring down 
prices. No such decrease would occur, 
however, in the case of goods where devalu-
ation had offset the differences in costs 
between domestic production and imports; 
which means that in the last analysis the 
impact would be exactly the same as that of 
protection equivalent in effect to devalua-
tion. Why, then, upset the whole internal 
system of costs and prices? 
The hard facts, however, do not work out 
as these arguments suggest, since the sur-
plus, thus increased by devaluation and the 
rise in prices, is not transferred to the 
collectivity, but remains in the hands of the 
owners of the means ofproduction and of the 
strata that are gradually acquiring trade-
union and political power. 
In any event, what happens to the 
surplus when export prices fall? It is trans-
ferred abroad either through an increase in 
the proportion of it that goes to the enter-
prises using the primary commodities in 
question, or through price reductions, 
according to the respective income-elastici-
ty of demand. 
4. Diversity of peripheral situations 
Hitherto we have considered the periphery 
as a whole in order to explain the unfavour-
able effects on trade relations produced by 
the structural disparity between it and the 
centres. But naturally the situation varies 
greatly from one peripheral country to 
another; there are some countries whose 
exports carry considerable weight in the 
world market and others whose influence is 
insignificant. The former are very much 
exposed to deterioration of their terms of 
trade, which is not the case with the latter, 
whose exports could undergo relatively 
intense expansion without ill-effects on their 
prices; although of course these countries 
cannot escape the adverse consequences of 
the deterioration affecting the first group. 
Between these extreme cases there is a 
whole range of intermediate situations. 
These differences, however, do not 
mean that industrialization is any less an 
indispensable requirement of peripheral 
development in the case just mentioned. 
Rather do they affect the scope and pattern of 
industrialization. 
Thus, for countries whose importance in 
the world market is slight the possibilities of 
expanding primary exports are greater than 
for the rest. But though great they are not 
boundless, since the countries' natural 
resources have their limits, however much 
technical progress may increase productivi-
ty. There comes a time when the expansion 
of production encounters the obstacle of 
rising costs which weaken the economic 
advantages of exports as against those of 
industrialization. 
But there is a further powerful justifica-
tion for industrial development. Export 
activities generally absorb a relatively small 
proportion of the labour force, especially 
when technical progress is propagated. 
Even though there may be no sign of a trend 
towards deterioration, industrialization is a 
necessity in order to absorb progressively, 
through the superimposition of new and 
higher-productivity layers of technology, 
labour from technological layers where 
productivity is much lower, with the conse-
quent increase in the economy's global 
product. 
If this is to be achieved in conditions of 
economic efficiency, it is essential that the 
rate of capital accumulation be speeded up 
in order not to divert resources from the 
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expansion of export activities, as long as 
these can continue to develop without rising 
costs or losses which exceed the cost of 
import-substituting industrialization. But 
so far we have said nothing of the penetra-
tion of technical progress in export activities. 
The increase in productivity which it im-
plies strengthens the tendency to deteriora-
tion of the terms of trade; and this is due to 
the regressive competition of the large 
proportion of the labour force employed in 
lower layers of technology, under the rule of 
market laws, as has already been explained. 
To enable the producer countries to retain 
the fruits of higher productivity, it would be 
necessary to get rid of this regressive 
competition, which could be done only after 
a more or less lengthy period, through more 
intense capital accumulation whereby the 
manpower in question could be employed in 
industry and other labour-absorbing activi-
ties. But as long as this does not occur in a 
sufficient degree, the fruits of technical 
progress in export activities will tend to be 
transferred abroad, in accordance with 
market laws, always provided that demand 
has not increased enough to absorb the 
production increment. 
The most important conclusion to be 
drawn in this deterioration thesis, which 
CEPAL expounded in its earliest years of 
activity, consists in the inescapable need for 
industrial development. Industrialization 
would gradually absorb, at rising levels of 
productivity and income, labour from the 
lower strata, while at the same time it would 
progressively correct the structural weak-
ness of the periphery. And as this was 
achieved, the periphery would be able to 
retain a steadily increasing proportion of the 
fruits of technical progress, instead of their 
being transferred through deterioration of 
the terms of trade under the rule of market 
laws. 
The shortage of land, in relation to the 
expansion of world demand, is also a highly 
important factor which in some cases helps 
to counteract the trend towards the deterio-
ration of the terms of trade in the spontane-
ous play of economic forces. This is what has 
happened in certain periods in the case of 
some temperate-zone products; but the same 
is not true of tropical products, to which we 
will refer a little later. 
When land is in short supply in relation 
to demand, an increase in productivity tends 
to raise land rent rather than transfer it 
through the deterioration of the terms of 
trade. 
It may also happen that part of the 
productivity increment is internally or 
externally absorbed in transport and market-
ing activities, especially when trade-union 
power is also vigorously operative in these, 
in contrast with its weakness in productive 
activities. 
But another and very important pos-
sibility is that technical progress may be so 
intense that despite the shortage of land the 
tendency to deterioration of the terms of 
trade reappears. 
One aspect of the centres' experience 
may be highly significant in this connexion. 
The old United States policy of parity of 
agricultural and industrial prices was in-
tended to offset deterioration; as were also, 
later on, the measures adopted to restrict 
production through the deliberate reduction 
of the land under cultivation. Moreover, the 
first International Wheat Agreement, during 
the great depression of the 1930s, was also 
supported by the United States as a means of 
counteracting the spontaneous play of 
market forces. 
Familiar, too, is the European Econom-
ic Community's policy of opposition to the 
deterioration of the terms of trade occasion-
ed by the considerable increase in agricul-
tural productivity. In reality, the intense 
absorption of redundant labour from the 
agricultural sector did not suffice to counter-
act the trend towards deterioration. 
The case of tropical agricultural com-
modities merits special mention. From the 
very earliest days of their large-scale expor-
tation the abundance of labour and the 
plentiful supply of land made for unfavour-
able income relations with the centres. Even 
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in the absence of further deterioration, a 
serious problem is still posed, since the 
factors referred to have prevented the terms 
of trade from improving in relation to their 
poor starting-point, as they might do in the 
course of time if capital accumulation and 
the labour-absorbing capacity of the system 
are intensified, with the resultant rise in the 
income of the labour force in the producer 
countries. 
What we have said of the congenital 
weakness of the periphery in internation-
al trade makes it possible to understand 
—conversely— the superiority of the cen-
tres. Demand-elasticity is in their favour; 
technical innovations and the diversification 
of manufactured goods enable them to 
develop their trade without the serious dif-
ficulties with which the periphery is faced in 
consequence of its structural time-lag. Any 
differences in elasticity that arise between 
the centres are smoothed out in a relatively 
short space of time, by virtue of the similar 
technological density and capacity for ac-
cumulation of the countries concerned. 
This accounts for the renewed influence 
of conventional theory on international 
trade, which has led the centres to adopt a 
trade liberalization policy. 
Let there be no misunderstanding, 
however, as to the true scope of our remarks. 
We do not mean that conventional interna-
tional trade theories are valid for the centres 
and not for the periphery; their validity is 
universal. But if they are applied to centre-
periphery relations, the effects of the periph-
ery's structural weakness must be remedied 
by the establishment of conditions in which 
trade can develop with the reciprocal bene-
fits that these theories imply. 
5. The ideological hegemony of the centres 
I cannot conclude these remarks without 
recalling that CEPAL's original thesis on the 
deterioration of the terms of trade had in its 
earliest years a patently polemical signifi-
cance. Upon it was based the unavoidable 
necessity of industrialization. But the old 
prescription for the international division of 
labour was still current, and more than one 
eminent professor in the United States —not 
to mention governments— denounced our 
poverty of doctrine. 
Under the rule of market laws, the 
periphery tended to transfer to the centres, 
wholly or partly, the fruits of the technical 
progress incorporated in export activities. 
An essentially structural problem. And there 
was no solution more economically ac-
ceptable than rational industrialization; not 
spontaneous industrialization, however, but 
deliberate, with the support of protection, 
without which the trend towards deteriora-
tion would be aggravated. 
It was all the more necessary to defend 
this thesis, inasmuch as in the centres 
another form of peripheral development, 
based on the technical progress of export 
activities, was still being advocated: a new 
version of the old prescription for the 
international division of labour. 
Nobody can deny, of course, the impor-
tance of incorporating technical progress 
into export activities. But we asked our-
selves then, not without some anxiety, who 
would benefit by it unless concomitant 
measures were adopted to mitigate, at least, 
the transfer of its fruits abroad. 
The position taken up by the centres, 
however, has not given way to the pressure 
of events. Even today new combinations of 
interests are still being sought whereby the 
periphery's natural resources can be devel-
oped so that the centres may obtain primary 
commodities at lower prices.5 
5 In this connexion it is worth recalling the idea tor 
the creation of a natural resources bank presented by 
Dr. Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, at the 
fourth session of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, held in Nairobi in May 1976. 
Perhaps because it was presented at the last moment 
and without prior preparation, this idea was not 
considered by the Conference. Personally, however, I 
was convinced that it was not without merit, since, 
properly worked out, it might imply new methods of 
negotiation and of obtaining financial resources where-
by peripheral production could be expanded and inter-
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As a matter of fact, it is natural that the 
centres should almost invariably look at 
these questions from the standpoint of their 
own interests: interests of the moment rather 
than inspired by long-term criteria. For 
market laws, as we have already said, are 
lacking both in a time horizon and in a social 
horizon. It is true that in the academic world 
deep-rooted convictions are still cherished; 
but neither is there room for doubt that the 
prestige of certain theories is largely based 
on their congruity with dominant interests. 
We have already mentioned that the 
centres have had to face their own deteriora-
tion problems, and have had to counteract 
the spontaneous play of market laws. But in 
doing so perhaps they were not aware of 
violating those laws; nor do the powerful 
show any such awareness in respect of 
certain economic principles which they 
proclaim: when these principles do not suit 
their convenience, they create other new 
ones! 
I have also said elsewhere that some 
economists in the centres advocate devalua-
tion in the periphery, not in this instance 
to remedy the consequences of inflation, but 
as a means of achieving industrialization 
without impairing market laws: a line of 
policy which, besides apparently respecting 
orthodoxy, has for the centres the virtue of 
lowering the prices of their primary imports. 
All this is very understandable from the 
centres* standpoint, as is likewise that other 
thesis of the internationalization of produc-
tion by grace and favour of the transnation-
als. Demand is quickly internationalized, 
but production with much less ease. 
In any event, the periphery has not yet 
learnt to evade the seduction of certain 
ideologies whose intellectual irradiation 
from the centres is still potent: spontaneous 
irradiation, and also propagation by deliber-
ate action. Reflections of both are to be seen 
in the case of the neoclassical theories. 
I trust that these pages will at least help 
to sow a few seeds of doubt as to the validity 
of these theories in the periphery. It would 
perhaps be one way of taking the first steps 
on a long and difficult road: the road to 
authenticity of development. 
I l l 
The contradictions of liberalism 
1. The conceptions of liberalism 
Political and economic liberalisms flow from 
the same philosophical source. They reflect 
human feelings and aspirations which for 
centuries have manifested themselves 
throughout the course of history, struggling 
ahead against enormous difficulties, surging 
forward and then ebbing back again. Full of 
ests harmonized on equitable bases. For that very 
reason I could not help feeling disconcerted by a de-
claration on the part of Dr. Kissinger himself, when he 
no longer held office as Secretary of State, to the effect 
that his idea would enable the centres to obtain at low 
prices the mineral products they needed for their 
development. In other words, technical progress and 
deterioration of prices! 
vicissitudes has this process been, and 
sometimes sanguinary, like the battle for 
human rights that is inseparable from it. And 
however much progress democratic institu-
tions still need to make in the centres, what 
has been achieved is of such great human 
significance that it would seem to be 
definitive or irreversible, although always 
exposed to setbacks. 
The ideas of political liberalism, which 
have so greatly influenced the constitutional 
organization of our countries, represent 
another of the valuable contributions made 
by the centres to the development of the 
Latin American region of the periphery. 
The struggle waged by political liberal-
ism throughout history reacts against the 
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concentration of power and its abuses and 
arbitrary practices, in defence of the freedom 
of the individual and of respect and firm 
support for his basic rights. 
The essence of economic liberalism too 
is the freedom of the individual—a freedom 
which, under the guidance of personal 
interest, would make it possible, according 
to the theorists, to attain definite objectives 
relating to the good of the community: 
productive efficiency and distributional 
equity on the one hand; and, on the other 
hand, the dispersion of economic power 
through competition among innumerable 
enterprises. 
As they were originally conceived, the 
philosophical correspondence between the 
two currents of liberalism was in reality 
perfect. 
Hence the fundamental importance of 
the concept of economic freedom and its 
political significance. The State did not need 
to intervene to regulate production or in-
come distribution, since free enterprise and 
competition continually made for the most 
appropriate solution from the collective 
point of view. 
Exempt from all responsibility in eco-
nomic life, unless it were that of preventing 
the restriction or elimination of competition, 
the laissez-faire State could devote itself to 
the full discharge of the essential functions 
attributed to it by the political theory of 
liberalism. 
But in the Latin American region of the 
periphery too political liberalism and its 
democratic evolution have had a long road to 
travel over very rough ground. There too 
liberal ideas had to overcome formidable 
obstacles and were and still are exposed to 
severe and painful vicissitudes. In all this 
there have been both illusions and realism, 
but also frequent and striking proofs of 
immaturity: anarchy and popular ferment, 
and repressive authoritarianism; a struggle 
for power in which lofty designs have been 
combined with eagerness to grasp at the 
advantages that power can give; a contest 
that finds expression in electoral campaign-
ing or in the use of force, either by those who 
wield it, or by others who make use of these 
latter to fulfill their aspirations or gratify 
their interests and ambitions. 
There are important features in this 
historical background which are still projec-
ted into our own time. I have to stress this for 
the very reason that I am trying to show here 
the emergence of new structural phenomena 
which had not appeared in earlier days. And 
I think that until relatively recent times it has 
not been possible to form a clear picture of 
the contradiction between the advance of 
democracy and the accumulation and distri-
bution patterns which characterize periph-
eral capitalism in the course of the changes 
in the social structure. 
Some of the features perceptible in the 
historical background may possibly be at-
tenuated, while others lurk beneath the 
surface of events. Butthe aforesaid structural 
changes play a dominant role; and when the 
system reaches a crisis they end by render-
ing democratic liberalism incompatible with 
economic liberalism. 
Undeniably, in the periphery democrat-
ic liberalism has still a very long way to go. 
But it does not consist in the mere text of a 
constitution; it is something more. Its full 
realization calls for institutional changes, 
education of the masses and of leaders, and 
new attitudes as well. But a risk —a great 
risk™ of succumbing to new illusions is 
incurred, if, in undertaking such reforms, we 
still shirk acknowledging the great flaws 
and contradictions in peripheral develop-
ment. And we hardly could acknowledge 
them as long as we go on looking at the 
system in the light of economic liberalism; 
for in the reflorescence of neoclassical 
theories the original concept has been 
adulterated in its very essence, and does not 
reflect the real conditions of the periphery. 
Nor do I think, moreover, that it ever has 
reflected them, although in other structural 
phases it has been possible to believe in 
some degree of consonance with reality. 
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2. The adulteration of economic liberalism 
Economic liberalism has been adulterated 
in respect of three main issues, which are 
worth noting here, even though very briefly. 
I refer to the concentration of power and its 
serious consequences; to the regulatory role 
of the market; and to social mobility. 
The concentration of economic power is 
imputable not so much to deliberate inten-
tion as to the actual operation of the system. 
It is a consequence of the penetration of the 
technique of the centres into the social 
structure of the periphery. 
Hence emerge the surplus and the great 
distributional disparities which, in the 
framework of structural change, deprive the 
market of the regulatory role it is held to 
fulfill for the benefit of the whole collectivi-
ty. It does not regulate capital accumulation 
or income distribution; and these serious 
flaws are responsible for the exclusiveness 
of peripheral capitalism, as well as for its 
conflictive tendencies when, over against 
economic power, the trade-union and politi-
cal power of the labour force rears its head. It 
is exclusive, above all, of the lower strata, 
which development bypasses. There eco-
nomic freedom signifies freedom to be poor. 
Political freedom-is nothing but freedom to 
decide without possessing effective means 
of discernment. And freedom of thought and 
speech, like other basic rights, are still a 
conventional flourish of rhetoric while there 
are social strata sunk in ignorance and 
penury, just as the vital concepts of equality 
of opportunities and social mobility are a 
chimera. 
Social mobility, as liberalism conceives 
it, carries the most capable and efficient to 
the top of the system. This undoubtedly may 
happen; but a great mass of human beings 
are left on the sidelines, since economic and 
social power favours some to the detriment 
of others. There is no such thing as equality 
of opportunities. And those who surmount 
obstacles and strata, and find a niche in the 
system, look upwards, towards the advan-
tages offered to them by the privileged-
consumer society, and not downwards, to the 
level whence they came. 
In this context a distinction must be 
drawn between those fundamental human 
rights and the way in which their observance 
has been endangered or distorted owing to 
the social structure. And this cannot be 
divorced from the transcendent problem of 
freedom: freedom for people to do what they 
like so long as it does not affect the freedom 
of the rest. This is a time-honoured principle 
of inestimable human value; and when I say 
human value I am already defining its true 
significance — self-determination. Free de-
termination of one's own line of conduct, not 
obedience to the orders of a superior or 
supreme authority. 
Herein lies the great intellectual and 
moral tragedy of economic liberalism; not to 
have perceived that the economic freedom 
of the individual could not function as its 
theorists had assumed. One of the gravest 
mistakes of these theories —indeed, the 
gravest of all— consisted in accepting eco-
nomic freedom in the abstract instead of in 
relation to the concrete system in which it 
evolves. A change is conceivable in which 
economic freedom acquires a completely 
different significance; a significance ap-
proaching the connotation ascribed to it in 
theory. 
3. Democratic liberalism in the centres and 
in the periphery 
In the centres the democratization process, 
in the light of experience, has been finding 
expression in institutional and juridical 
changes which attempt to make good unde-
niable deficiencies. But perhaps the most 
striking flaw in the process is to be found in 
the direct and indirect consequences of the 
interplay of power relations. There can be no 
doubt that the mechanisms of representative 
democracy operate with perfect regularity 
and that human rights are effectively re-
spected. But equally unquestionable are the 
concentration of capital and the consider-
able influence on the formation of public 
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consciousness exerted by vast and complex 
interests, through their ascendency over the 
press and other mass media, through subsi-
dies to political parties and through the close 
liaison between these interests and the 
political leaders. 
In the periphery, the concentration of 
capital, over and above that of land, gives 
considerable political power to the upper 
strata. This, as we have seen, is a phenome-
non closely linked to the social structure and 
the changes therein. During the phases of 
outward-directed growth politics were a 
matter for the various groups of the upper 
strata, with some intervention by the nascent 
middle classes, combined with intermittent 
appeals by the rival factions to the relegated 
masses. In the subsequent course of devel-
opment, structural changes have increasing-
ly made for the sharing of political power 
with the lower and especially the middle 
strata. The upper strata will do everything 
they can to contain, manipulate and influ-
ence the political power of the middle strata 
and to co-opt their leaders. Nevertheless, the 
expansion of these middle strata, their 
increasing concentration in the towns and 
the development of the mass communication 
media will end by flinging wide the gates for 
the advance of democracy. 
Through this gateway are released the 
feelings, aspirations and interests of the 
disadvantaged strata. All this gives impetus 
to the political dynamics of these strata and 
their aspiration to elect their representatives 
freely and to be elected. Nor does that 
impetus take long to acquire redistributive 
significance, with the development of the 
trade-union and political power of the labour 
force by which it is accompanied. And thus, 
essentially owing to structural changes, the 
institutions of democratic liberalism irra-
diated from the centres take on a new 
meaning, unfurl along a new social horizon. 
In this, as in other respects, peripheral 
capitalism acquires some of the characteris-
tics of the centres, notwithstanding the great 
structural disparities. 
This process is apparent mainly in the 
distribution struggle, and as time goes by 
gives rise to increasingly crucial political 
problems. What is more, the struggle is much 
grimmer in the periphery in view of the great 
disparities and the notorious insufficiency of 
material for distribution. And thus, the 
chronic inflation to which the conflictive 
tendency is leading breaks out in these 
latitudes with exceptional intensity. Indeed, 
in this respect we are ahead of the centres. So 
to Latin America falls the doubtful merit of 
being the forerunner! 
Thus a very serious problem is posed 
which representative democracy has not yet 
been able to resolve. Those who regard 
democratization as the source of the distribu-
tion struggle in the middle strata and the 
social and political ferment in the lower 
strata are undoubtedly grievously mistaken. 
The source lies in the great flaws of the 
system. I would say rather that the march of 
representative democracy shows up these 
flaws, but has neither been able to correct 
them, nor given any sign of ability to tackle 
the accumulation problem. But at all events, 
let us beware in time of inferring that the 
trouble is due to defects in the democratic 
process, although they undoubtedly do exist. 
4. The use of force, and options in face 
of the crisis of the system 
And now we come to an aspect of the ques-
tion which it is of paramount importance to 
understand in order to interpret the dynam-
ics of peripheral capitalism. The distribu-
tion struggle cannot go on indefinitely, since 
the desire to share in the surplus can be 
satisfied only as long as its total amount 
increases at least as fast as the global 
product. 
If this limit is overstepped, enterprises 
will try to raise prices in order to restore the 
surplus, with the result that the inflationary 
spiral will be triggered off, or accentuated if 
older forms of inflation were already devel-
oping; all this we know already from 
experience. And we also know that beyond 
that limit the surplus cannot be further 
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compromised, not because there is insuffi-
cient room to do so, but because the upper 
strata are not prepared to accept the disrup-
tion of the privileged-consumer society. In 
such circumstances the rules of the monetary 
game become inapplicable, for inevitably 
the monetary authority has to resign itself to 
the inflationary spiral, with all its increasing-
ly disturbing effects, whatever attempts 
may be made to repress some of its more 
acute manifestations. 
Sooner or later the use of force super-
venes. Later, perhaps, rather than sooner, 
when the distribution struggle is mitigated 
by the availability of abundant funds deriv-
ing from the exploitation of natural re-
sources. Only two major options are open to 
the use of force: to stifle the trade-union and 
political power of the masses in order to curb 
and eventually eliminate the inflationary 
spiral; or to concentrate the means of 
production in the hands of the State so that 
decisions as to the new system and the 
destiny of the surplus may come from the 
summit. Needless to say, both options are 
incompatible with the advance of democra-
tization. 
The two options are diametrically op-
posed, since the first draws its inspiration 
from the idea of re-establishing, if not 
exalting, the consumer society, and to that 
end has recourse to economic liberalism, 
sacrificing political liberalism. Whereas the 
second option sacrifices both forms of liber-
alism, under the guidance of ideas which are 
essentially divergent from the philosophical 
source whence they sprang, since the con-
centration of economic and political power 
in the hands of the State necessarily means 
the abandonment of the very principles of 
political liberalism and the democratic con-
ceptions that stem from them. Accordingly, 
fundamentally different notions of democra-
tization become inevitable. 
Whatever their intrinsic value, how-
ever, the influence of these ideologies on the 
periphery clearly exemplifies the persistent 
historical phenomenon of ideological de-
pendence upon the centres: a form of 
dependence which precisely by its doctri-
naire fervour helps to discourage the search 
for authenticity in the major decisions of 
development. 
This is not merely an understandable 
phenomenon of intellectual irradiation, but 
also one of deliberate propagation, since in 
the periphery the broad field of the Latin 
American region lies wide open to the 
persistent effort made by both the hegemo-
nic powers —although motivated by dif-
ferent interests— to disseminate their ideol-
ogies. That is, ideologies and information 
selected to bear them out. It is therefore very 
difficult to gain an objective understanding 
of the course of events and to comprehend 
their significance. At the international level 
we are witnessing the strengthening of the 
efficacy of the mass communication media, a 
process which once again brings to light the 
ambivalence of technique, its capacity to 
achieve not only positive results but others 
that are negative and disruptive. 
It is by no means easy to overcome this 
and the other forms of dependence in the 
praxis of development. But let us also 
acknowledge that on the intellectual plane 
there are vast possibilities of seeking au-
thentic options. 
The use of force cannot be kept up 
indefinitely. What is to be done afterwards? 
Will institutional reforms in the political 
field be enough? As I have said before, 
institutional reforms are useless if they are 
founded on the system's basic flaws. It is 
essential to get at the bottom of the system, 
but invariably under the guidance of those 
major values without which development 
would be devoid of human significance. 
Such is now the complexity of develop-
ment and the interdependence of its com-
ponents. What is needed is the transforma-
tion of the system. And the starting-point 
must be a synthesis in which, beyond the 
tide of ideologies, certain essential princi-
ples of political liberalism are combined 
with genuine forms of that economic free-
dom which is an integral and inseparable 
element in the fundamental concept of 
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liberty. Economic freedom for individuals 
and for enterprises — for great enterprises 
emancipated alike from the power of the 
owners of capital and from the power of the 
State, in accordance with new norms of 
community life. The fact that liberalism has 
been adulterated in the course of the 
development of peripheral capitalism must 
not on any account be taken as a valid 
justification for sacrificing all it means in 
terms of human comity. In contrast —and 
this I have no hesitation in asserting— such 
lofty ends cannot be attained under a system 
of imitative capitalism which, as it seeks to 
develop in the image and likeness of the 
centres, can survive in the long run only by 
throwing human rights overboard and giving 
its blessing to social inequity. 
